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Using a dynamic model of the control of an infectious disease, we derive the 
conditions under which eradication will be optimal. When eradication is feasible, 
the optimal program requires either a low vaccination rate or eradication. A high 
vaccination rate is never optimal. Under special conditions, the results are 
especially stark: the optimal policy is either not to vaccinate at all or to eradicate. 
Our analysis yields a cost-benefit rule for eradication, which we apply to the 
current initiative to eradicate polio. 
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The  eradication of an infectious disease is an extreme—indeed, a singularly 
ambitious—policy goal.  It is to be contrasted with a policy of control, which reduces 
incidence below the competitive level but not to zero, and a policy of elimination, 
which cannot stop disease imports but which can prevent a local epidemic. It is a goal 
that has been tried before (hookworm, yellow fever, yaws, malaria), but achieved only 
once (smallpox). It is a goal that is being attempted again now (poliomyelitis, 
dracunculiasis), and for which there exists a long wish list of future candidates 
(among them, mumps, rubella, lymphatic filariasis, cysticercosis, and measles).  It has 
even been suggested that the newest infectious disease, SARS, be eradicated. 
 
Why eradicate? Suppose that a disease can be controlled—say, by means of 
vaccination. Suppose as well that the disease is already being controlled, and at a very 
high level—so high, in fact, that a slight increase in the vaccination rate would cause 
the disease to be eradicated. Eradication would increase costs in the short run, and 
prevent a few additional infections. But in making the pathogen disappear, eradication 
would also avoid the need ever to vaccinate in the future: a huge “dividend.” A very 
high level of control will therefore never be optimal. Intuitively, the optimal policy 
will require no control, a modest level of control, or eradication.  In this paper, we 
develop this intuition formally. 
 
A disease can only be eradicated if it is eliminated everywhere in nature. Hence, our 
analysis applies to two kinds of situation: at the global level and at the level of the 
nation state after every other country has already eliminated the disease. If countries 
were symmetric, it might seem that the calculus of eradication would be the same for 
both of these situations. Barrett (2003), however, shows that, depending on the costs 
and benefits facing the “last” country, global disease eradication—a global public 
good—may be either a coordination (weakest link) game or a prisoners’ dilemma.
1 
Though Barrett (2003) exposes the underlying incentive problem, his analysis relies 
                                                 
1 Of course, eradication could also be globally inefficient or it could be in every country’s interests to 
eliminate the disease unilaterally. Neither of these possible cases is economically interesting. In a 
related paper, Cooper (1989) examines international cooperation in the control of cholera and the 
eradication of smallpox, arguing that successful cooperation hinges on whether knowledge of cause 
and effect exists. Our analysis, and the literature summarized in this section, presumes such knowledge. 
  1on a static framework in which eradication is assumed to be instantaneous—an 
outcome that may not be optimal (or even feasible). Our paper focuses on the 
dynamics of eradication, solving explicitly for the conditions under which eradication 
(whether at the level of the globe or the “last” country) will be optimal.
2 
 
Geoffard and Philipson (1997) also develop a dynamic model of the economics of 
disease eradication, but their focus is the positive analysis of public vaccination policy 
being (partially) crowded out by market behaviour (under the assumption that the 
private demand for vaccination increases with prevalence). They also do not solve 
explicitly for the conditions under which eradication is socially optimal, let alone the 
optimal path to eradication. Indeed, in their model, eradication can only be achieved 
in the limit as time goes to infinity (their analysis only compares steady states).  
 
In a model in which people are either susceptible or infected (never immune), and in 
which the control is treatment rather than vaccination, Goldman and Lightwood 
(2002) derive the conditions under which asymptotic eradication is an optimal steady 
state. Moreover, they show that the initial infection rate determines whether 
asymptotic eradication is optimal—a result also demonstrated here (see Section 4.3). 
However, there is no dividend to eradication in the Goldman-Lightwood framework, 
the focus of our inquiry. Such a dividend can only be realized if eradication is 
achieved in finite time. As noted by Gersovitz (2003), “An important question would 
be whether settling for an internal steady state with positive infection is dominated by 
a push for eradication in finite time.” We address this question directly.
3 
 
The dividend from eradication can be enormous. According to Fenner et al. (1988), 
the annual global benefit of smallpox eradication was about $1.35 billion (using 1967 
as a base year), while the total cost of eliminating smallpox from the remaining 
endemic countries was about $300 million. Assuming a three percent discount rate, 
the benefit-cost ratio for smallpox eradication was thus about 150:1. Taking into 
account only the incremental costs needed to eliminate smallpox from the remaining 
                                                 
2  Indeed, we shall show that, for the case of linear costs—the case actually studied by Barrett (2003)— 
it will be optimal to eradicate instantaneously, if allowed by the feasibility constraints. 
3 Related papers on the economics of vaccination, but not eradication, include Brito, Sheshinski, and 
Intriligator (1991), Geoffared and Philipson (1996), Francis (1997), Gersovitz (2003), and Gersovitz 
and Hammer (2003).  
  2endemic countries ($100 million), the benefit-cost ratio was even higher: about 450:1. 
Smallpox eradication was thus an astonishingly good deal for the world. It was also a 
good deal for individual countries. The United States, for example, saved about $150 
million annually because of smallpox eradication (Fenner et al., 1988), mainly in the 
form of avoided vaccination costs. Again, using a three percent discount rate, the 
eradication dividend to the United States alone was about $5 billion, a small fraction 
of the (essentially, one-time) cost of eradication. 
 
Smallpox was the ideal candidate for eradication: there were no long-term carriers; 
smallpox survivors were immune for life; infected persons were easily detected; and 
only persons showing symptoms (probably) could transmit the disease. Moreover, the 
disease was only mildly infectious (relative to some other diseases, that is; the disease 
could be eliminated by mass vaccinating “only” 80 percent of a population), and the 
vaccine was relatively inexpensive (a single injection offered effective immunization). 
Being a live vaccine, immunization was risky, so that the rich countries had a strong 
incentive to eradicate; and because smallpox killed around a third of infected 
individuals, poor countries also gained substantially from eradication. 
 
Unfortunately, the eradication of other diseases is likely to be more difficult, and less 
attractive in benefit-cost terms. For example, though measles kills about three-
quarters of a million children every year in developing countries, in rich countries, 
where the disease has been eliminated, the measles vaccine is given as part of a 
combined vaccine (measles-mumps-rubella or MMR) and the savings from 
eliminating just the measles component may be relatively small.
4 As well, measles is 
more infectious than smallpox, and eradication would require vaccination (in multiple 
doses) of a very high proportion of the population (probably 95 percent or greater)—a 
problem if marginal costs increased in the vaccination rate. As explained in Section 7, 
the epidemiology of polio eradication is also problematic, and the economics far from 
                                                 
4 Estimates of the savings from measles eradication vary. According to Miller et al. (1998), the net 
benefits of measles eradication to the US would be between $500 million and $4 billion (1997 dollars). 
Savings estimates by Carabin and Edmunds (2003) are in the range of $10 million and $623 million for 
a selection of rich countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom). One reason for the lower savings estimated by Carabin and Edmunds (2003) is the 
assumption that vaccination at some level would need to continue even after the wild virus had been 
eradicated because of the threat of bioterrorism—an issue discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
  3overwhelming, even though the current campaign has already eliminated the disease 
from most parts of the world.  
 
The threat of bioterrorism further weakens the economic case for eradication. 
Countries may now feel the need to continue to vaccinate, even if at a relatively low 
level (Carabin and Edmunds, 2003, for example, assume that vaccination for measles 
would be reduced but not stopped even after eradication), or to stockpile vaccine, and 
prepare for emergency distribution in the event of an attack (the approach being by a 
number of countries, including the United States, with respect to smallpox). These 
kinds of measures shrink the eradication dividend, while probably having no effect on 
the economics of control.
5 
 
In summary, the economic calculus for eradication of the most favourable remaining 
candidate diseases is likely to be more finely balanced than for smallpox—meaning 
that our framework for benefit-cost analysis needs to be more carefully specified. Our 
paper is a contribution to this effort. We derive a cost-benefit rule for optimal 
eradication, and demonstrate its utility by applying it to the current global initiative to 
eradicate polio. 
 
Our paper progresses as follows. Section 2 develops the epidemiological model that 
describes how eradication might be achieved in finite time, and Section 3 specifies 
our economic model of eradication. Section 4 solves for the optimal eradication 
policy, and Sections 5 and 6 analyse special cases. Section 7 applies our framework to 
the current effort to eradicate polio. Section 8 summarises our main results.  
 
2.   Epidemiology 
 
We take as our starting point Anderson and May’s (1991) model of the dynamics of 
immunization, a standard in the epidemiology literature:
6 
 
                                                 
5 The rich countries would presumably be the target of a bioterrorist attack, but the rich countries are 
likely to eliminate candidate diseases for eradication unilaterally, making further measures to defend 
against a bioterrorist attack unnecessary.  
6 There is one minor difference between our specification and Anderson and May’s. Anderson and May 
(1991) assume that only newborns are vaccinated. We assume that any and all susceptible persons may 
be vaccinated, not just newborns. 
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where x(t) is the fraction of the population that is susceptible,  ) (t λ  is the force of 
infection (the rate at which susceptible individuals become infected), and p(t)  
represents the overall rate of vaccination (only susceptible individuals are vaccinated). 
This dynamical system assumes that population is constant (births equal deaths; we 
normalize by setting population equal to one), with m representing both the birth and 
mortality rate. It also assumes that the disease is non-lethal. The parameter v 
represents the rate at which infected individuals become immune. Finally, R0 is the 
basic reproductive rate of the microparasite (for a disease to spread, it is essential that 
R0 > 1). A brief explanation is given in Appendix A. 
 
For our purposes, this system of differential equations poses a problem: If the system 
(1)-(2) begins at λ (t) > 0, it can only converge to λ (t) = 0 as  ∞ → t .  This wouldn’t 
matter if we only needed to study steady states. However, as noted in the introduction, 
the reason for pursuing a policy of eradication, rather than of high control, is to reap 
the benefits of not having to vaccinate post-eradication. If the aim is to study the 
optimality of eradication, the dynamics must permit eradication in finite time.
7 
 
Just how to model this is not so obvious. To Gersovitz (2003), moving “away from 
the no-eradication property of the model would require a more cumbersome model of 
finite lives.” Our approach is much simpler. We solve for the steady state, 
 and assume that the dynamics can be represented by an 
adjustment equation, 
, ) 1 ( 0 0 pR R m − − =
∞ λ
 
(3)    00 () [ ( 1 ) () () ] tm R p t R λσ λ
•
=− − − t
                                                
 
 
7 We need hardly add that smallpox was eradicated, and in a period of just 10 years. Empirically, (1)-
(2) is invalid, at least for small λ. 
  5for  λ (t) > 0, where σ is the speed of adjustment parameter.
8 Conveniently, (4) 
captures (almost) everything we need in a single equation. For our purposes, x(t) is 
not of direct importance. x(t) is only important insofar as it affects λ (t), and this 
effect is reflected in (3). 
 
Of course, simplicity always comes at a cost. Eqs. (1)-(2) imply that a small increase 
in the vaccination rate will reduce the force of infection by more when λ is high than 
when  λ is low (for a given value of x). In epidemiological terms, the number of 
follow-on infections prevented by a single vaccination increases with the force of 
infection. Our use of Eq. (3) fixes this effect. In economic terms, eq. (3) makes the 
marginal benefit of vaccination independent of the vaccination level. When 
comparing a policy of high control versus eradication, use of (3) will not distort 
matters very much. The simplification matters more when comparing a policy of low 
control versus eradication. This is especially important for our linear model, presented 
in Section 5, and we discuss this assumption again in this section. 
 
Before presenting our economic model, one further adjustment is required. Our main 
interest lies not in λ (t) but in the proportion of the population that is infected under a 
control program. Denote this proportion y(t). Assuming homogenous mixing, λ (t) 
will be proportional to y(t) (Anderson and May, 1991). In particular, we can write 
() () ty t λ β =  where β is a transmission parameter. We can thus rewrite (3) as 
 












 . Note that, since  0 R  > 1 by assumption, K must 
be strictly positive. We can now proceed with the optimisation problem. 
 
3.  The optimisation problem 
 
The socially efficient vaccination program maximizes the objective function  
                                                 
8 In Appendix A we discuss how the size of σ relates to the parameters in the original Anderson and 
May (1991) model.  
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where by(t) is the cost at time t of having a proportion y(t) of the population infected, 
c(p(t)) is the cost at time t of vaccinating a proportion p(t) of persons per unit of time 
(e.g., per year), and T is the length of the vaccination program, which may be finite or 
infinite. If the disease is eradicated, T will be finite, and the integral of social welfare 
from T to infinity will be zero and so can be ignored. 
 
We assume that c(0) = 0 and that c(p) is strictly increasing and strictly convex. In 
Sections 5 and 6 we consider special cases of linear and quadratic costs, respectively. 
Note that c(p) includes more than just the costs of vaccine and of administering the 
vaccine. It also includes the costs of any side effects. The latter cost can be 
significant. For every million people given the smallpox vaccine, for example, a few 
will die and many others will suffer severe reactions. Similarly, and as explained in 
Section 7, the oral polio vaccine can cause paralysis in a very small percentage of 
cases. Worse, it can circulate in the community, infecting other susceptible persons. 
When a disease is prevalent, these associated effects are little noticed, but when 
control becomes very high, they become more prominent.  
 
The government’s problem is to maximize (5) subject to (4) and the additional 
constraints: 
 
(6)  ,  ( ) 0 pt ≥
 
(7)  ,  ( ) 0 yt ≥
 




(9)  .  ( ) 0 yT =
  7 
Except where stated otherwise, we shall assume  . This is the steady state 
stock of infections when p = 0 (see eq. (4)).  
0 (0) yR = % K
 
Eq. (9) is of particular interest. It says that, once the disease is eradicated, there will 
be no more infections—and, therefore, no further need to vaccinate. The time T at 
which eradication is achieved is endogenous, determined as part of the solution to the 
optimisation problem. As noted before, T may be infinite, implying that it is not 
optimal to eradicate the disease. In our formal mathematical treatment, however, it 
shall prove convenient to assume that T is finite, i.e. that the choice of T is restricted 
to T∈ [0,τ], where τ is very large (e.g., 5 million years). If we find that T = τ is 
optimal, this can be interpreted as saying that T is infinite. 
 
4.  The optimal policy 
 
Taking the shadow price α(t) associated with (4) to be positive, the current value 
Hamiltonian may be written as 
 
(10)  .  0 ( () ) () () [ ( () ) () ] Hc p tb y t t R K p ty t ασ =− − − − − %
 
Along the optimal program, the shadow price α(t) obeys the following differential 












At any point in time, p(t) maximizes the Hamiltonian. For p(t) positive, maximization 
requires 
 
(12)  0 '( ) cp R σ α = % . 
 
Along the optimal programme, vaccination should be chosen at each instant in time 
such that marginal cost equals marginal benefit—the latter being equal to the shadow 
  8value on infections, α, times the change in the number of infections attributable to a 
small change in the vaccination rate. Eq. (12) defines an increasing function, p(α), for 
0 '(0) cR α σ ≥ % . For  0 '(0) cR α σ ≤ % , the constraint p(α) = 0 applies. 
 
From (4) and (12) we have 
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There are two qualitatively different cases to consider. In the first, the   line lies 
above the   line. In the second, these lines intersect in the interior. When solving 
both cases, we start by analysing the optimal solution assuming that T is given. Later 








4.1 Case  1 
 
We first consider the case where the  0 α
•
=  line lies above the  0 y
•
=  line, i.e. where 
α, defined by (14), is higher than α
0, defined by (15). Rearranging gives: 
 












Before proceeding with the mathematics, consider the economic implications of this 
condition. Begin at t = 0 with y > 0 given. Now, set p = K and hold the vaccination 
rate at this level indefinitely. The marginal cost of this vaccination policy (at every 
moment in time) is given by the RHS of (16). From (4) we know that pursuit of this 
policy implies  as  0 → y τ → t  (recall that τ is very, very large).  Eq. (4) also tells us 
that the instantaneous effect of the policy is to reduce the number of infections by 
0 R σ % . Each infection saved yields a social benefit, b, and so the marginal, 
instantaneous benefit of this vaccination policy is b 0 R σ % . The full marginal benefit is 
larger, however, because the effect of vaccination is long lasting. From (4) we know 
that, when p = K,  σ − = y y & . Hence, the infections saved by this policy (at each 
instant in time) degrade at constant rate σ . Of course, the economic benefit is also 
discounted (at rate r). The marginal benefit of following this policy at each instant in 
time is thus  . As already noted, pursuit of this policy eradicates the 
disease only in the limit (that is, the disease is not eradicated). Solving the integral 
(for 
() rt d t
σ





τ → T , which is close to ∞) yields the LHS of (16): the present value marginal 
benefit of vaccination for this policy.  
 
Inequality (16) is a kind of reference condition. For consider a small deviation in the 
policy described above. Suppose in particular that at some date the vaccination rate is 
increased very slightly above p = K for a very short period of time and then set equal 
to K again. The cost of this one-time deviation will be approximately equal to the 
RHS of (16). The benefit, however, will strictly exceed the LHS of (16) because this 
tiny, one-time increase in vaccination will cause the disease to be eradicated in finite 




                                                 
9 Intuitively, eradication implies that the infections saved from a policy deviation do not degrade. 
Hence, it might seem that a necessary condition for eradication to be optimal should be given by (16) 
but with σ removed from the denominator. We are unable to prove this for the general model, but our 
analyses in Sections 5 and 6 of two special cases confirm this intuition. 
  10Case 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The optimal development of y(t) and α(t) (and thus of 
p(t)) depends on the exogenously given value of T. We have drawn trajectories for 
three different values of T. For each trajectory we have assumed that   (this 
gives the steady state value of y when p = 0). The top trajectory in Figure 1 is for a 
“small” T, denoted T
0 (0) yR = % K
1. Along this trajectory, p(t) increases over time. The middle 
trajectory is for a value of T which implies that p(t) must be constant over time. 
Finally, the bottom trajectory is for a “large” T, denoted T
2. Along this trajectory, p(t) 
declines over time. For y(0) given, as the value of T increases, the terminal value of 
the shadow price, α(T), falls. It approaches  α
0 as T approaches infinity (strictly 
speaking, τ). 
 
The value of the Hamiltonian at time T, denoted H(T),  follows from (9) and (10): 
 
(17)  .  0 () (() ) () [ () ] HT cpT T R K pT ασ =− − − %
 
If we can find a T* such that H(T) ≥ 0 for T ≤ T* and H(T) ≤ 0 for T ≥ T*, then this 
will be an optimal solution to our optimisation problem when T is endogenous.
10 
 
In Appendix B we show that H’(T) > 0, and that the value of p making H(T) = 0, 













p* thus depends on both the cost function and K (that is, on m and R0). 
 












                                                 
10 See, e.g., Theorem 1 in Seierstad (1988). Notice that the Hamiltonian given by (10) with p(α) 
inserted is linear, and thus concave, in y.  
  11The value of α* depends on the factors determining p* and on σ. Since p* > K, it 
follows from (15) and (19) that α* > α
0.  Since all paths leading to α* > α
0 result in 
eradication, it follows that inequality (16) is a sufficient condition for eradication to 
be optimal, confirming the economic intuition given earlier. 
  
If we can find a trajectory for (y(t),α(t)) satisfying the differential equations (4) and 
(11), starting at (y(0),α(0)) where y(0) is given by (8) and ending at (0,α*) at some 
time point T, then this T, denoted T*, is the optimal end point. 
 
The optimal trajectory in Figure 1 is thus the one that terminates at α(T) = α*. All 
three of the paths shown in Figure 1 are potential candidates. Which trajectory is 
optimal depends on the value of α*, and thus on the factors that determine α*.  
 
4.2 Case  2 
 
Assume now that the inequality in (16) is reversed. Since (16) is a sufficient condition 
for eradication to be optimal, we should expect that, for Case 2, eradication may or 
may not be optimal. We confirm this intuition below. 
 
Case 2 is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 assumes that there exists a trajectory 
for (y(t), α(t)), starting at (y(0), α(0)), where  and  0 (0) yR = % K ) ( ) 0 ( σ α + > r b , and 
ending at (0, α*) at t = T*. This case is thus similar to Case 1. The only difference is 
that we can now be sure that p(t) increases over time. 
  
It is also possible that all trajectories starting at and  0 (0) yR = % K ) ( ) 0 ( σ α + > r b  
reach y = 0 at a value of α that exceeds α*. Under these conditions, no trajectory of 
the type illustrated in Figure 2 will exist, and eradication in finite time will not be 
optimal. 
 
However, there will always exist an unstable stationary point (y
∞, b/(r+σ)), where  
 




∞   =−   +  
% . 
 
The trajectory starting at this point and moving in a northwest direction intersects the 
α-axis at a point labelled α
∞ in Figure 3. If a trajectory of the type drawn in Figure 2 
does not exist, we have α
∞ >α*. Under these conditions, and taking , we 
have α(T) > α
0 (0) yR = % K
∞> α* for all ] , 0 [ τ ∈ T . This means that p(T) > p* for all ] , 0 [ τ ∈ T . 
From Appendix B it follows that H(T) > 0 for all ] , 0 [ τ ∈ T . The optimal end point, 
therefore, is τ  (in practical terms, infinity).
11 The optimal solution is to set 
t r b t p ∀ + = ( ) ( ) σ , arriving at y
∞ asymptotically.
12 That is, the disease is controlled 
but not eradicated. It is clear from Figure 3 that p will be smaller, and y
∞ closer 
to , the smaller is  0 (0) yR = % K ) ( σ + r b and the larger is  0 0) c '( R σ % . If the marginal 
cost of vaccination exceeds the social marginal benefit when p = 0—that is, if 
0 '(0) cb ( R ) r σ σ > % + —then the optimal policy will be to set p = 0 always 
(technically, before τ is reached), unless eradication in finite time is optimal. 
 
To sum up, we have thus far established a sufficient condition for eradication to be 
optimal, and we have characterized the other possible qualitative solutions. To derive 
more specific results—in particular, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
eradication to be optimal—we will have to work with explicit cost functions. We turn 
to this task in Sections 5-6, but first it will prove helpful to consider the effect of the 
initial conditions on the results developed thus far. 
 
4.3 Initial  conditions 
 
To this point we have assumed that the starting value of y is given by y’s stationary 
value when p = 0—that is,  0 R K % . What would be the optimal policy at an early stage 
of a new disease when the initial infection rate is substantially below 0 R K % ?  
 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Theorem 1 in Seierstad (1988). 
12 Strictly speaking, since τ is finite, the trajectory lies infinitesimally above the trajectory going from 
0 (, ( RKb r ) ) σ + %  to (0, α
∞) via (α
∞, b/(r+σ)), lying close to the latter point most of the time. 
  13Plainly, if eradication were optimal when , then it will also be optimal 
when  . Indeed, the optimal program will require that vaccination proceed 
along the same optimal trajectory as derived above (that is, the optimal trajectory 
corresponding to the starting value  ).  The only difference is that, since 
the starting value of y is different, the starting value of p must also be different.  Our 
analysis thus applies equally well to a situation in which a disease has been controlled 
previously as to a situation in which a disease has not been controlled at all. 
0 (0) yR = %




                                                
0 (0) yR < %
(0) y =
 
The initial conditions only really matter when eradication would not be optimal for 
. If y(0) is small enough (relative to y 0 (0) yR = % ∞), then it can be shown that 
eradication will be optimal. This possibility is illustrated in Figure 4, which differs 
from Figure 3 only with respect to the initial condition. For the starting values (y(0), 
α(0)) in Figure 4, the trajectory reaches (0, α*), and so it is optimal to eradicate the 
disease at some time T* < τ. The reason that eradication will be optimal when the 
initial rate of infection is low is not that fewer people need to be vaccinated at any 
given time.
13 The reason is that people need be vaccinated for a shorter period of time.  
 
The new disease SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), we now know, emerged 
in late 2002 in China. In March 2003, the World Health Organization issued a global 
alert, and countries immediately began taking measures to control the disease. Some 
scientists argued that this was not enough, however, that the opportunity to eradicate 
the disease should be seized before SARS had a chance to become established. As 
Burke (2003) put it, “epidemic-control efforts should not simply be maintained, but 
doubled, and redoubled again.” The rationale for moving quickly was that there 
existed but a short epidemiological window during which SARS could be readily 
distinguished from influenza. Wait too long, or act too passively, and eradication 
might cease to be feasible. This paper points to a further rationale: While a short, 
 
13 In our model, control is achieved by means of mass vaccination. Only in a model with heterogeneous 
mixing would a strategy like “ring vaccination” work, making it possible to isolate infected persons 
and to vaccinate only those susceptible persons who came into contact with infected individuals before 
quarantine. 
  14sharp response may be optimal at the early stage of the disease, a sustained effort at 
eradication may not be optimal after the disease has become established.
14 
 
5.  The special case of a linear cost function 
 
To get sharper results, it will prove useful to consider the case of a linear cost 
function. Specifically, let  
 
(21)  ,  ( ) cp c p =
 
where c is a positive parameter. To get a mathematically meaningful solution to our 
maximization problem, we assume instead of (6) that  
 
(22) ( ) [0, ] p tP ∈ , 
 
where P is some large value (certainly large enough to make eradication possible). 
We shall in particular consider the limiting case in which  ∞ → P . 
 
Instead of (12) we now get 
 








< % , 
(23)  








> % . 
 
The optimal vaccination program thus reaches the optimal steady state infection rate 
as quickly as possible.  This result is not very surprising; we should expect to obtain a 
most rapid approach solution for the linear model. What is more surprising, however, 
is that, for the linear model, there are only two optimal steady states. It is optimal 
                                                 
14 As well, and bearing in mind footnote 13, for SARS the total effort required to isolate all infected 
individuals would be lower at any given time at an early stage of the disease than after the disease has 
become established.  For a discussion of whether SARS is now eradicated, see Enserink (2003). 
  15either not to vaccinate at all or to eradicate. A policy of disease control (short of 
eradication) is never optimal. 
 
What is the reason for this result? Recall from Section 2 that our simplification of the 
dynamics implies a constant marginal benefit of vaccination for any level of control 
short of eradication. With the linear model, marginal costs are also constant.  Hence, 
if it is better to vaccinate many persons than one fewer, then it must also be better to 
vaccinate one person than none. We know that eradication is better than a policy of 
vaccinating many persons. For the linear model, therefore, eradication must also be 
better than a policy of vaccinating even one person. However, eradication need not be 
welfare superior to a policy of zero control.  Hence, with the linear model, only one of 
two extreme outcomes will be optimal: eradication or no control. It is important to 
emphasize that this result follows not only from the assumption about costs, but also 
from the way in which we have represented the dynamics of infection, as noted in 
Section 2.  Even with linear costs, positive vaccination short of eradication may be 
optimal if the number of follow-on infections prevented by each vaccination were 
decreasing in the vaccination rate. 
 




R c σ α = . Inserting 












As in the general case, α* > α
0.  We also have   as 
0 * α α → ∞ → P .  
 
When α
0 < b/(r+σ), the linear model yields an outcome qualitatively identical to the 
general model: eradication is optimal. The only noteworthy difference is that, for the 
linear model, eradication is achieved immediately for the limiting case of .  ∞ → P
 
The more interesting case, drawn in Figure 5, arises when α
0 > b/(r+σ). As was 
shown for the general case (see Figure 3), we now have an unstable stationary point 
(y
∞, b/(r+σ)). The difference is that, for the linear model, y
∞ will always equal 
  160 (0) yR =
y
K ; partial control is never optimal. The trajectory rising from this point 
intersects the α-axis at α
∞. Assume first that α
∞ < α* (we have not illustrated this 
case). Then there will exist a trajectory for (y(t),  α(t)) starting at (y(0),  α(0)), 
where K R0
~
) 0 ( =  and α(0) > b/(r+σ), and ending at (0, α*) at t = T*. This solution 
is akin to the general case shown in Figure 2. For the linear model, p(t) = P for all t∈ 
[0,T*]. For the case illustrated in Figure 5, α
∞ >α*. Given K R y 0
~
) 0 ( = , α(T) > α
∞ > 
α* for all T [0, ] τ ∈
, ]
. It is easily verified from (17) and (23) that this implies H(T) > 0 
for allT [0 τ ∈ . The optimal end point is therefore τ—in practical terms, infinity.
 15 
The optimal policy is never to vaccinate (strictly speaking, when τ is finite, we should 
have p(t) = 0 until just before τ, after which p(t) = P).  
 
The limiting case of   yields a particularly useful result (the proof is given in 
Appendix C): For the linear model, and taking 
∞ → P
∞ → P , eradication is optimal if and 
only if  
 
(25)  r R b c 0
~
σ < . 
 
Moreover, if condition (25) holds, and if a policy of setting  ∞ → P  is feasible, then 
eradication should be achieved instantaneously.
16  
 
6.  The special case of a quadratic cost function 
 
For the general model, three qualitatively different outcomes may be optimal: no 
vaccination, control short of eradication, and eradication. With a linear cost function, 
only the two extreme outcomes of no vaccination and eradication are optimal. For the 
quadratic cost function considered in this section (in which marginal cost is near zero 
for the first vaccination), the outcome of no vaccination will not be optimal. Our aim 
                                                 
15 See Theorem 1 in Seierstad (1988). 
16 It is interesting to compare this result with the corresponding condition given in Barrett (2003). 
Setting  n = α = 1 and p
u = 0 in Barrett’s eq. (7) gives the result that eradication is optimal if 
bR0 r ≥ c. This is equivalent to the condition given above once we set  1 = = β σ . In Barrett’s 
(2003) model, p
u need not equal zero because the social benefit of vaccination is non-linear in the 
vaccination rate. 
  17here is thus to derive conditions under which it will be optimal to eradicate rather than 
to control a disease.  
 






cp p = , 
 
where g > 0, giving a marginal cost c’(p) = gp. For this case, the function p(α) 
defined by (12) gives 
 



















α = , 
 












α = . 
 












then eradication will be optimal. The interesting case is when the inequality in (28) is 
reversed, in which case eradication may or may not be optimal. For the general 
  18model, we were only able to derive a sufficient condition for eradication to be 
optimal. For the specific quadratic function, however, we can give a necessary and 
sufficient condition. Appendix D derives explicit solutions for the differential 
equations (4) and (11), and solves for the conditions under which an optimal 
trajectory leading to (0, α*) exists. These calculations imply that: For the quadratic 











This condition is very similar to the condition for eradication for the case of a 
constant unit cost (see Section 5). The only difference is that the relevant vaccination 
cost now is not the unit cost (constant for all vaccination rates), but the marginal cost 
at the minimum vaccination level necessary to achieve eradication (i.e., K; see (4)).  
 
It is significant that the optimality condition for eradication should depend on this 
marginal cost, because the literature on vaccination routinely assumes (implicitly, at 
least) constant average costs. When   is large, K will be large:  a sizable proportion 
of the population must be vaccinated in order to reduce incidence to zero. Expanding 
coverage, however, is costly. It means reaching people in remote areas, the homeless, 
people with compromised immune systems, and people with religious objections to 
vaccination. The marginal cost of eradication can be substantially greater than the 
average cost.  
0 R
 
7.  Application to polio eradication 
 
Our aim has been to characterize the optimal disease eradication program. However, 
in the course of doing so we have also derived cost-benefit rules for eradication, and it 
is tempting to apply these to a real problem. We do so below. 
 
The global polio eradication initiative—according to the World Health Organization 
(2001: 1), “the largest public health initiative in history”—aims to eradicate polio by 
2005. Bart, Foulds, and Patriarca (1996) and Khan and Ehreth (2003) have shown that 
  19the program promises the world a benefit in excess of cost, assuming that eradication 
can be achieved by means of the oral live-attenuated polio vaccine (OPV) and that 
vaccination can cease after the wild virus has been eradicated. In this section we use 
our model as a check on these studies, and to evaluate an important, alternative 
scenario.  
 
OPV has a number of advantages: it is inexpensive and easy to administer; it 
stimulates local immunity in the intestines, preventing spread of the disease; and 
when the vaccine virus is shed in areas with poor hygiene and sanitation, it immunizes 
the community. OPV also has one disadvantage: in a very small number of cases, the 
vaccine can cause paralysis, either in vaccinated persons (vaccine-associated paralytic 
polio or VAPP) or in susceptible individuals in the community (circulating vaccine-
derived polioviruses or cVDPV). VAPP is especially problematic when vaccination 
coverage is high, for then the risk of VAPP can exceed the risk of infection by the 
wild virus. cVDPV, by contrast, is especially problematic when vaccination stops, for 
then susceptible persons are vulnerable to infection by cVDPV. Though fewer than 
100 cases of cVDPV have been documented to date, there is a chance that cVDPV 
could become endemic—making it necessary to continue OPV vaccination 
indefinitely (WHO, 2003: 16). Our analysis has shown that maintaining a high level 
of vaccination is not optimal when eradication is feasible. Of course, it may be 
optimal to maintain vaccination at a high level when eradication (including 
eradication of vaccine-derived virus) is not feasible, but the economics of the polio 
eradication initiative will plainly be very different if OPV-vaccination must be 
continued.  
 
Our framework is not suited to evaluating the decision to maintain high vaccination 
indefinitely, but it can be used to evaluate the eradication options. One option is to 
stop OPV vaccination following a synchronized, global pulse campaign in which very 
high rates of coverage are achieved over a very short period of time. This would 
reduce the number of susceptible individuals everywhere, and so reduce the risk of 
cVDPV spreading. However, this approach would still be a gamble; it may not 
  20prevent the disease from remerging.
17 Another option would switch from OPV to the 
inactivated polio vaccine (IPV). IPV has one great advantage: it is a killed poliovirus, 
and so cannot cause polio. However, IPV also has disadvantages: it is more expensive 
than OPV and must be injected; it does not prevent transmission by vaccinated 
individuals; and it does not spread immunity throughout the community.  
 
Use of either vaccine, even for purposes of control, implies a trade-off. In areas with 
excellent hygiene, sanitation, and health infrastructure, and with high vaccination 
coverage, OPV has only a cost advantage over IPV, whereas IPV protects vaccinated 
individuals from the risk of VAPP.  After polio had been eliminated from the United 
States, continued use of OPV caused about 10 cases of VAPP a year—a small 
number, perhaps, given the extent of vaccination coverage, but a sufficient risk to 
impel the US recently to switch from OPV to IPV, despite the higher cost.
18 In poor 
countries, OPV remains the vaccine of choice, mainly because of cost and the benefits 
of community-wide protection. 
 
Is polio eradication optimal? In our framework, this is roughly the same as asking if 
conditions like (25) and (29) hold for polio. Let us see. From Appendix A (eq. (A.7)), 
we know that  0
~
R σ  can be approximated by m(R0 −1) (m+ v). For polio,R0 ≈ 6
≈18.25
 
(Anderson and May, 1991: 70). The infectious period for polio lasts about 14-20 days 
(Anderson and May, 1991: 31), and the parameter v is approximately equal to the 
inverse of this duration (Anderson and May, 1991: 125).
19 Assuming that the duration 
of infection is 20 days, and taking time units to be years, implies that v . 
Though we take these parameters to be the same for all countries, the remaining 
parameter, m, representing the birth and death rate, can vary. We take it that m = 0.01 
for rich countries and m = 0.03 for poor countries, though our results will not be 
sensitive to these values.
20 
 
                                                 
17 To make matters worse, vaccine-derived polio virus can be excreted for years by people with 
immune deficiencies.  
18 There are about 250-500 cases of VAPP worldwide every year (WHO, 2003: 16). For a cost-benefit 
analysis of the decision by the US to discontinue OPV, see Miller et al. (1996). 
19 Our model does not include a latent period, but for polio this is short—about 1-3 days (Anderson and 
May, 1991: 31). This means that a person who acquires poliovirus ceases to be infectious after 
about15-23 days. 
20 Over the period 1980-2001, population growth was 0.7 percent in the high-income countries and 2.7 
percent in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2003: 40). 
  21The literature only offers estimates of average costs, and these are assumed constant. 
Khan and Ehreth (2003: 703) give cost estimates for two kinds of vaccination 
program, routine immunization and mass vaccination on national immunization days. 
For poor (rich) countries, these are $1.22 ($11.50) and $0.25 ($5.64) per dose, 
respectively, using OPV. We take the marginal cost of OPV to be the higher of these 
estimates: $1.22 per dose in poor countries and $11.50 per dose in rich countries. Four 
doses of vaccine are required for immunity, and so our estimates for c are $46 in rich 
countries and $4.88 in poor countries. 
 
According to Miller et al. (1996: 969), IPV is about 35 percent more expensive than 
OPV in the United States.  In poor countries, IPV is even more expensive relative to 
OPV, partly because IPV requires a syringe and must be administered by a trained 
health worker. According to the polio eradication initiative’s web page, IPV is more 
than 5 times as costly as OPV, leaving aside administration costs.
21 We assume that a 
full, four-dose course of IPV costs $25 in poor countries and $62 in rich countries.  
 
The literature does not give true estimates for b, the welfare cost of paralytic polio. 
Khan and Ehreth (2003: 703) only give estimates of medical care costs, assumed to 
equal $420 in poor countries and $25,000 in rich countries. These probably 
underestimate the true costs substantially. Miller et al. (1996: 968) use a very 
different estimate in their study of the decision to switch from OPV to IPV in the 
United States: $1.2 million, the compensation awarded to VAPP victims in the United 
States. Rather than use these numbers in our analysis, we solve for the value of b that 
just makes eradication optimal, and then discuss whether, given these values, 
eradication really is optimal.  
 
There is just one more adjustment to make. Most people who become infected with 
poliovirus do not show symptoms. About one in 200 suffer paralysis (WHO, 2002). 
We therefore take the value of b to be 0.005 times the cost of a single case of polio 
paralysis. 
 
                                                 
21 See http://www.polioeradication.org/vaccines/polioeradication/all.  
  22We can now proceed with our calculations.
22 Letting r = 0.03, Table 1 shows the 





Optimal Polio Eradication Cut-Off Values for b 
 





Based on the assumptions underlying these calculations, and assuming that b should 
represent medical care costs (see below), polio eradication would seem not to be 
optimal, even assuming that use of OPV can be discontinued. This is a qualitatively 
different conclusion than appears in the earlier literature. Bart, Foulds, and Patriarca 
(1996) find that the benefits of eradication exceed the costs for the world as a whole, 
compared with a policy of routine immunization; and Khan and Ehreth (2003) find 
that the total medical cost savings of eradication exceed the total cost.  However, we 
would caution making a direct comparison between these studies and ours. Among 
other differences, our model compares an optimal non-eradication outcome with the 
eradication alternative. The alternatives investigated in these earlier studies are not 
chosen optimally. 
 
As well—and as recognized by the authors of both of the above studies—medical care 
costs are not appropriate measures for b. The welfare costs of infection are likely to be 
much higher. Plainly, the cut-off value of b for the rich countries is less than a tenth of 
the compensation awarded to VAPP victims in the US, implying that eradication is 
                                                 
22 In the analysis that follows, we ignore the cost of VAPP associated with OPV vaccination. 
23 Since we only have average cost data, and no information about how costs vary with the vaccination 
rate, we use inequality (25), after substituting (A7). OPV calculations: for rich countries we have 
$46 < 0.005*b*0.01*(6−1)/[(18.25+ 0.01)*0.03]
$4.88 < 0.005*b*0.03*(6−1)/[(18.25
; for the poor, 
+ 0.03)*0.03
$62 < 0.005*b*0.01*(6
].  IPV calculations: for the rich we 
have  −1)/[(18.25+ 0.01
$25 < 0.005*b*0.03*(6−1)/[(18.25
)*0.03]; for the poor, 
+ 0.03)*0.03]. The values in Table 1 are found by 
solving these inequalities. 
  23optimal from the perspective of the rich countries. The cut-off value for b for poor 
countries is very low by comparison, but the opportunity costs of polio eradication are 
different in poor countries. The value per disability life year (DALY) avoided by 
polio eradication exceeds $900.
24 Many other health interventions in poor countries 
can save a DALY for a fraction of the cost (see, for example, Jamison et al., 1993).  
 
What does this mean? It means that, if all other countries eliminated polio, every rich 
country also would want to do so. The poor, however, would not. Of course, the gain 
for the rich countries may exceed the loss for the poor, so that, with suitable transfers, 
polio eradication may make all countries better off. Indeed, this presumably explains 
why the polio eradication initiative was undertaken in the first place, and why the rich 
countries and other donors are financing the (incremental) costs of polio elimination 
in the poor countries. At the same time, our results are consistent with the ambivalent 
attitude towards polio eradication expressed by public health experts.
25 
 
What are the economics of eradication using IPV? Following the same approach as 
above, but using the higher costs of vaccinating with IPV, we find that eradication by 
IPV is less attractive all around but remains a good deal for the rich countries (several 
industrialized countries have already switched to IPV). For the poor countries, by 
contrast, eradication by IPV is almost certainly uneconomic. Still, eradication by IPV 
may be globally optimal. To know for sure, however, a full cost-benefit analysis 






                                                 
24 According to Khan and Ehreth (2003: 704), over the period 1970-2050, polio immunization would 
save 6.89 million polio cases and 4.396 million DALYs in Africa.  Khan and Ehreth (2003: 703) 
assume that 10.27 percent of all polio cases result in paralysis. Hence, the implied number of DALYs 
lost per case of paralytic polio is about 4.396/(6.89*0.1027) = 6.2. The cut-off value of a case of 
paralytic polio is thus about $5,947, or $5,947/6.2 = $959 per DALY. 
25 See, in particular, Taylor, Cutts, and Taylor (1997) and Sutter and Cochi (1997). 
26 In addition to performing sensitivity analysis, our analysis might be extended by incorporating 
further adjustments. For example, there is typically wastage in the use of vaccine. As well, vaccination 
efficacy is typically less than full. Making adjustments for wastage and efficacy would effectively 
increase vaccination costs. Finally, we suspect thatR0may be larger in poorer countries with weaker 
standards of hygiene and sanitation. Increasing the value of R0 in the poor countries would obviously 
lower the cut-off value of b. 
  248. Conclusions 
 
Our analysis applies to infectious diseases for which eradication is epidemiologically 
feasible. At a minimum, these include global diseases like polio, measles, and rubella 
(Knobler, Lederberg, and Pray, 2002). We have shown that eradication, when 
feasible, will often be preferable to control—and will always be preferable to high 
rates of control. We have also shown that rapid progress towards eradication will 
usually be preferred. Only when vaccination costs increase substantially with the rate 
of vaccination should a slower course be followed. 
 
An implication of our analysis is that, when rich countries are observed to set a high 
level of control, this can be taken to be an economic indicator of eradication being 
possibly optimal. Plainly, if a country would eliminate a disease even when 
eradication is infeasible (because of the risk of imports), then it would certainly 
eradicate the disease if eradication were feasible—eradication would cost no more 
than elimination but offer a huge dividend in avoided future vaccination costs. For the 
poor countries, the calculus is likely to be different. As indicated by our analysis of 
polio eradication, transfers from the rich to the poor are almost certain to be needed to 
effect global eradication of this disease. A full, global cost-benefit analysis is needed 
to determine whether eradication is a good deal overall, but our optimality conditions 
provide a basis for making a first assessment of the economics of eradication versus 
control. 
 
We end with a final observation. It is routine in health economics to rely on average 
benefit and cost estimates. For most policy analysis, this is probably satisfactory. For 
eradication, it is not. Eradication is an extreme goal, and our paper shows that our 
analysis of an eradication program needs to begin from the perspective of the 
program’s end. Eradication only succeeds if the last carrier of the disease is isolated, 
and the persons with whom he or she may have come into contact are vaccinated. It is 
fitting that our optimality rule should also focus on this last case.   
 
 
  25Appendix A 
The relationship between our dynamic specification and the specification used by AM 
[Anderson and May (1991)]: 
 
At any point in time, the proportion of the population that is susceptible is x(t), while 
the proportion that is infected is y(t). The remaining proportion of the population, 1 - 
x(t) - y(t), is immune.  
 
The interpretation of (1) is that the gross increase in the proportion of susceptibles is 
equal to the birth rate (m), while the gross reduction in the proportion of suscepticles 
is the sum of those who die naturally (mx(t)), those who become infected (λ(t)x(t)), 
and those who become immune due to vaccination (p(t)). 
 
In addition to equation (1), AM assume that the proportion of infected persons 
develops according to 
 




The interpretation of (A1) is that those who have become infected either die naturally 
(my(t)) or recover into the immune class (vy(t)). 
 
The “force of infection”, λ(t), is the per capita rate of acquisition of the infection. In 
other words, λ(t)∆t represents the probability that a given susceptible host will 
become infected in a small time interval ∆t. AM argue that with homogenous mixing, 
λ(t) = βy(t), where β is a transmission parameter that depends on various 
epidemiological, environmental, and social factors. Inserting λ(t) = βy(t) into (A1) 
and defining the basic reproductive rate of the microparasite (according to “Type II 
survival”; see AM: 75) by 
 







we can rewrite (A1) as (2). 
  26 
The differential equations (1) and (2) have a stationary state (for a constant p) given 
by x
∝ = 1/R0 and  . Starting at the stationary state, consider the 
effect of a small increase ε in the proportion of infecteds, and a corresponding 
reduction in the proportion of susceptibles. Since  λ(t) = βy(t), this implies that λ 
increases by βε. Immediately after such an increase, it is straightforward to see from 
(2) that we get 
0 (1 ) mR p R λ
∞ =− − 0
)
 
(A3)  0 ()( vm R λ λε
•
∞ =+ −. 
 
With the differential equation (3) we would instead get 
 
(A4)  .  σβε λ − = &
 
Using (A2), it is clear that these two differential equations give the same value for λ
•
 
if and only if 
 
(A5)  .  0 0 ) 1 ( pR R m − − = =
∞ λ σ
 
The RHS of (A5) depends on p, so that the value of λ
•
 following from AM and from 
(3) cannot be the same for all p. In the numerical application in Section 7 we let σ be 
determined by (A5) with p = 0, i.e.  
 
(A6) ) 1 ( 0 − = R m σ .  
 
Using (A2) and the definition of  0
~
R  given at the end of Section 2, it follows that 
 







R σ . 
 
 
  27Appendix B 
The eradication date when eradication is optimal: 
 
Differentiating (17), remembering that p(α) maximizes H, and using the envelope 




'( ) [ ( ) ]
T









Since y(t) approaches zero at t = T, it follows from (13) that the term in square 
brackets in (B1) is positive. Moreover, α(T) is decreasing in T (see the discussion in 
Section 4.1). From (B1) it therefore follows that H’(T) < 0. Hence, if we can find a 
value T* giving H(T*) = 0, then this will be an optimal solution to our optimisation 
problem.  
 
Using the notation p
T = p(α(T)), and inserting (12) into (B1), gives 
 
(B2)  .  ( ) ( ) [ ] '( )
TT HT cp p Kc p =− + −
T
 
The value of p
T (denoted p*) which makes H(T) = 0 is given by (18). From (12) it 
follows that the corresponding value of α, denoted α*, is given by (19).  
 
The RHS of (B2) is increasing in p
T for p
T > p*. For p
T > p*, as is the case in Figure 




Proof that, for  , if  ∞ → P r R b 0 c
~
σ > , then the optimal policy is never to vaccinate, 
whereas if  r R b 0 c
~
σ < , then eradication is optimal: 
  
Recall from (23) that it will either be optimal to do nothing or to vaccinate at the 
maximum feasible rate. The payoff from not vaccinating is: 
 




W e by dt y
r
∞
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The payoff from immediate eradication (implying T ) is:  0 →
 




eradication rt We c P d t
− =−= ∫ c P T
  
As  , the term including P will dominate the other terms in (4), so that  ∞ → P
 
(C3)  P R t y 0
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~
) 0 ( ) ( σ − =  
 












Substitution into  (C2) gives 
 


















Proof that, for the quadratic model, eradication is optimal if and only if 
r R b gK 0
~
σ < : 
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Rather than derive conditions ensuring that  * α α
∞ > , our approach is to derive 
conditions under which an optimal path leading to (0, α*) exists. To do this, it is 
useful to rewrite differential equations (11) and (4) as functions of the time variable h, 
which denotes the time remaining until T* is reached. With this notation, (11) and (4) 
can be written as 
 
(D1) '( ) ( ) ( ) hr h b α σα ++ = , (0) * α α =  
 















(D4)  K R B 0
~
σ − = . 
 









−+  =− +  ++ 
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Inserting (D5) into (D2) and solving gives 
 
(D6)  , 
()
12 1 () ( )
hr h yh e J J e J J




(D7)  1 *







=−  ++ 
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For the situation described by Figure 2, y(h) is positive (for h > 0) and increasing as 
we travel backwards in time. By inspection of (D6), y(h) will be positive (for h > 0) if 
J1 + J2 > 0. Since  , and since  is positive for 
the situation described by Figure 2,  y(h) will be increasing if J
()
12 '( ) ( ) ( )
h yh e J J r e J
σ σσ
−+ =+ + + 1
r h σ
1 J
1 + J2 > 0.  Hence, for 
the kind of situation depicted in Figure 2, eradication will be optimal if and only if J1 
+ J2 > 0. Inserting A and B from (D3) and (D4) into (D7) and (D8) we find 
 





gK J J σ < ⇔ > + , 
 
which is the condition given in (29). Finally, note that, if (29) holds then (28) will 
hold, confirming that (29) is the necessary and sufficient condition for eradication to 
be optimal for the quadratic model. 
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